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**AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS
TO US NATIONAL STRATEGY**

Joseph B. Howard

**Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

14 March 1973

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
MONOGRAPH

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
TO US NATIONAL STRATEGY

BY

COMMANDER JOSEPH B. HOWARD

US NAVY



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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A MONOGRAPH

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ABSTRACT

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This paper highlights the primary capabilities of the amphibious force in the mid-range period. A historical background provides general information concerning the value of amphibious operations to various countries dating from days prior to Christ through the war in Vietnam. The remainder of the article contains the main thrust, the essence of which states that amphibious operations conducted by the US Navy/Marine Corps team will have a definite role in national strategy during the next ten years. The US Navy/Marine Corps team was chosen as an example of future US amphibious operations because the size of the present amphibious fleet is number limited to such an extent that large-scale operations similar to those conducted by the Army, Navy and Marines in World War II are no longer possible. Therefore, the use of amphibious operations by the United States are forecast to be confined to sub-theater conventional operations or to theater conventional operations in coordination with the Army and Air Force. Details regarding the exact size and mission of the amphibious force are expanded to the extent that the "unclassified" classification will permit. The advantages and disadvantages of the Seabasing Concept are discussed in detail with the conclusion being reached that seabasing will not be a "cure all" type of military operation, but that it will support the smaller scale political/military aspects of the Nixon Doctrine.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the general capabilities of amphibious conventional warfare forces as possessed by the United States and to relate them to their unique ability to enhance the strategy of the United States in the mid-range period (through 1985). It recognized that the art of amphibious warfare encompasses the sealift of Army as well as Marine Corps ground units; however, this article will be limited to the Marine Corps lift which is intended to serve as an example for all services. The rationale of the predictions or forecast of the chapter are contingent upon the overall national strategy and the monetary constraints placed upon the Department of Defense budget. The breakdown of this monograph consists of the following categories:

Historical Background

How our amphibious force fits into the mid-range national strategy, (general rationale)

How the force presently is structured, (the make up)

What its particular advantages consist of, including its more specific ability to support national strategy, (specific rationale)

What it may look like/how it may function in the late 1970s and early 1980s, (seabasing)

Summary

Appendix I--Table of Navy/Marine Corps Amphibious Terms

Appendix II--Illustration of a Seabased Amphibious Operation

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Amphibious operations, or combined operations as they were known early in World War II, are not new. For centuries military leaders have had to plan ship-to-shore invasions of enemy coasts, each campaign providing new and unusual experiences all of which have advanced the state of the art. Amphibious warfare started at least thirty-five centuries ago when an Egyptian king, faced with the problem of transporting his troops across a large body of water, conducted the first amphibious assault in recorded history.¹ The invasion of the city of Troy by the Greeks under Achilles, Agamemnon and Ulysses set the stage for the history of military amphibious operations.

Since those Trojan days, military records indicate many successful invasions by sea. After the Greeks and Romans employed such tactics, the science of amphibious warfare continued to develop during medieval and early modern periods. Japan staged a series of amphibious operations against Korea between 1592 and 1598 that were highly successful. Prior to these operations the list of amphibious landings is too long to relate; however, some are noteworthy. In July 1346 the English invaded Normandy, almost six hundred years before the famed D-day landing of World War II. The summer of 1588 saw the combined attempts of the British Fleet and adverse weather conditions smash the Spanish Armada and thus foil Spain's attempt to invade Sir Francis Drake's homeland.

The first amphibious operation conducted by the United States took place in 1776 when a party of Marines and blue jackets made a

landing at Nassau in the Bahamas, and from that date until 1941 the US Marines participated in some 180 landing operations. During the Mexican War in 1847 landings were made at Vera Cruz, and there were many others during the Civil War, some of which were spectacularly successful, and some costly failures.²

A truly large-scale, modern type of amphibious landing was not attempted until World War I. This operation, then called a combined operation, was conducted by the British in the Dardanelles Campaign in 1915. The resultant total failure can be credited to the lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy, and the fact that available air power was not employed. However, the debacle of the Dardanelles was offset by the successful attack on Zeebrugge three years later.³

World War II marked the high point in the use of amphibious warfare which has not been surpassed to date and is not likely to be in the foreseeable future. "Every major military offensive launched by the United States during World War II was initiated by an amphibious assault."⁴

In the Atlantic theater the North African Campaign was launched by the landings at Casablanca in November 1942 and the start of the finish for Adolph Hitler came on June 6, 1944 in France. The Allied Expeditionary Force that was carried by a fleet numbering thousands of ships and landing craft, stormed the beaches of Normandy under cover of naval gunfire and allied air power.

The war in the Pacific from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, from New Guinea to the reconquest of the Philippines was a series of amphibious operations unprecedented in history.⁵

Experiences were gained in each assault. In November of 1943 the landings at Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands proved to be a tragic lesson. The lack of underwater reconnaissance prior to the landing resulted in many amphibious landing craft being stranded on coral atolls (reefs) well off shore and thence caught in a murderous Japanese crossfire. The result was an unnecessary loss of numerous Marine lives and Navy personnel together with their landing craft. This unfortunate episode in amphibious warfare brought about the birth of the US Navy's underwater demolition teams (UDT) which have proven their value over and over again by reconnoitering approaches to the beaches, destroying submerged obstacles, and providing critical intelligence data prior to every landing attempt since Tarawa in late November of 1943. Thus a new dimension was added to the art of over-the-beach assault. In addition to the birth of the UDT, entire new families of landing ships, craft, vehicles and auxiliary equipment emerged from the Pacific Campaign. By the end of the war more than 84,000 landing ships and craft of all types had been produced.⁶ Victory in the Pacific was highlighted by the invasions and capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa in 1945 by US ground forces. The landing at Okinawa on 1 April 1945 marked the last major invasion from the sea by the United States in World War II.

In order to comprehend the mechanics of that vast Okinawan operation a single transport group is sighted as an example.

Commodore Milton O. Carlson's transport group 'Dog' formed half of Southern Attack Force commanded by Rear Admiral John L. Hall. This group, which had the duty of landing the 7th Infantry Division (Major General W. V. Arnold, USA) on the Beaches Purple and Orange, comprised four transport divisions and two tractor groups, with a total of 16 APA, 7 AKA, 1 LSD, 1 LSV, 30 LST, and 22 LSM. Multiply these figures by four, and you will have a fair idea of the magnitude of the entire amphibious landing on the Hagushi beaches.⁷

World War II thus ended the greatest display in history of the ability of man to project power from the sea to the land. The control of the sea allowed the United States to win the land war. The control of the land around the sea denied the enemy the capability to gain or regain control of the sea and prevented him from stopping the flow of allied logistical supplies. Amphibious operations, the interface of the land and the sea forces in World War II, were a primary key to victory.

The Korean and Vietnamese wars once again displayed the value of amphibious operations to the United States. However, the scale was far reduced from the World War II extravaganza. During the conflict in Vietnam a new use of amphibious operations was evolved. Small scale operations utilizing helicopter vertical envelopment in conjunction with the across-the-beach conventional assault was developed. These operations were normally of short duration (less than one month), and as such were sometimes thought of as raids. The medical facilities of the ships just off of the coast were used to support the forces ashore and on many occasions the ground troops in the field were served hot meals prepared aboard ship while actually in a combatant status. This somewhat different

use of the amphibious force with its battalion or sometimes several battalions supported by shipboard-based helicopters, and Marine fixed-wing air firepower based ashore, provided additional flexibility and mobility. The practice of keeping the afloat force close to and supporting the ground operations "kicked off" a concept which is now known as seabasing and is discussed in more detail later.

THE GENERAL RATIONALE

History has proven the value of amphibious warfare capabilities in the past. What about the future? President Nixon is quoted as follows:

I cannot think of a more important aspect of seapower than the ability to project US forces ashore in strength exactly tailored to the situation and with the flexibility which accrues from being based afloat.⁸

The President, reporting in his 1971 foreign policy message on the record of implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, noted that "Worldwide we cut back the US official presence, civilian and military, for a more efficient and less conspicuous approach."⁹ It is under this low profile concept of the future that our amphibious force should find its place in our national strategy. With overseas basing decreasing, particularly in the Pacific Basin, the need for amphibious mobility to support the Nixon Doctrine increases. It is interpreted that "realistic deterrence" is the backbone for the strategic implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. In this regard, it is envisioned that strategic nuclear and theater nuclear wars are no longer probable as no single country can win a decisive victory.¹⁰ This in turn leaves the categories of theater conventional and sub-theater conventional wars as the most likely arenas for conflict. For the purpose of this chapter, sub-theater conventional war is defined as any conflict similar to Korea/Vietnam and includes all lower levels of conflict such as internal conflicts, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, etc.

THE BATTLE OF

"An amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships and craft involving a landing on a hostile shore."¹¹ In order to accomplish this mission in World War II the United States had vast numbers of troop ships, cargo ships, and landing craft.

The amphibious ship force at the end of FY 1973 will include approximately 65 ships.¹² This is much when compared to World War II shipping but today's force is modern and capable of 20 knot speeds. Five LKAs (a large ship capable of handling both helicopters and surface landing craft) and the last few of 23 of the new class tank landing ships (LSTs) are being procured and are included in the above total at about 65 ships.¹³ Other ships in the total include two command ships (LCCs), seven amphibious assault ships (LPDs/helicopter aircraft carriers), six amphibious cargo ships (LKAcs) and the remainder composed of amphibious transport ships (LPAs), amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and dock landing ships (LSDs).¹⁴

The missions and capabilities of each of the most modern classes of these ships are as follows:

(1) The LCC is a command and communication ship for the amphibious task force commander, the landing force commander and the tactical air control group commander during an amphibious operation. A modular amphibious control center gives the amphibious task force commander control of all tactical phases of the landing

operation. A tactical intelligence center and a large communication unit support the control center.

(2) The LPB is an amphibious assault ship designed to transport 2,000 fully equipped Marine assault troops into combat areas and land them by helicopter at designated inland points. This technique of vertical envelopment delivers combat ready Marines behind enemy defenses where they can isolate strategic strong points, disrupt communications and proceed to converge with beach-landed Marines in gaining ultimate control of the objective area. Command spaces and communications facilities are available aboard the LPBs.

(3) The LPD has capabilities for transporting 800 combat-equipped Marines to an assault area and then putting them ashore by amphibious vehicles or boats and by helicopter where necessary. The amphibious transport dock also has command spaces and facilities for the amphibious commander.

(4) The LST is larger and faster than previous tank landing ships. It can carry 350 troops and is designed to operate with 20-knot amphibious squadrons in order to transport tanks, heavy vehicles, machinery and supplies which cannot readily be landed by helicopters or boats. It has a ramp at the bow for unloading toward the beach and a stern gate for use alongside the pier or directly to the ocean. It also has a helicopter platform which is now a reality on all modern amphibious ships.

The LHA is not included in the above list as it is still in the construction stage and much information remains classified. However, it is correct to state that it is designed to be the

largest of the amphibious fleet and will possess multiple mission capabilities.

In addition to the ships per se, there are other special warfare elements which come directly under the Navy's portion of the operation. These units are not considered supporting elements (such as aircraft carriers) but are trained by the Amphibious Type Commander and come directly under the operational control of the Amphibious Task Force Commander (Naval Officer).

These elements include special communications units, beach landing area coordination units, and the underwater demolition teams which have missions to conduct hydrographic reconnaissance and to clear prospective landing beaches.

The landing force, the land half of the amphibious team, consists of the Marine troop units and Marine aviation units assigned to conduct the amphibious assault. It is commanded by the Landing Force Commander (CLF) who is the Marine counterpart to the Navy's Amphibious Task Force Commander (CATF).

During an amphibious operation it is standard operating procedure for the CATF to be in overall operational control until control is passed ashore. At that time the Landing Force Commander takes command of the ground forces and is supported as necessary by the Navy (CATF). The Marine Landing Force is self-contained. Its total size depends on the mission to be accomplished and can range from a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF, division/wing size) to a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB, 2/9 to 5/9 of a MAF) and then down to Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU, 1/9 of MAF or reinforced battalion).

In every case the Landing Force Commander (CLF) commands his own air assets which are integral to the MAF, MAB, or MAU. In the case of the MAF the CLF has at his disposal a Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), which includes fixed and rotary wing aircraft. A Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) supports the MAB while a large Marine helicopter squadron is assigned to the MAU.¹⁵ It should be noted that sole "make up" of the Navy's part of the team, which includes Naval Air/Surface Fire Support (Supporting Arms), is to support the final product, the projection of force ashore or more simply stated, the Marine Corps mission. In accomplishing this mission the Navy could assign all of its amphibious assets to the operation or as few as four to six major amphibious ships (including at least one LPH) to support a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU). This latter combination of ships plus the MAU is referred to as an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). If the LPH is not included, the group is then reduced to an ATE/BLT. The Battalion Landing Team (BLT) then loses its vertical envelopment capability.

In the conduct of an amphibious evolution, every facet of Naval warfare is included in the planning and execution of the operation. Thus far only the elements which actually project forces ashore (The Navy/Marine Amphibious Team) have been discussed. In order to get those forces to the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) under hostile conditions, the US must control the surface of the sea, the air above it and water below the surface. In effect this means that surface warfare, air warfare, anti-air warfare, mine countermeasures and anti-submarine warfare forces must support the amphibious task force when operational conditions so dictate. This

complete integration of so many types of naval forces makes the total amphibious operation one of the most complex command and control evolutions to be envisioned by any military commander.

Appendix I is provided for convenience; contains a table of miscellaneous Navy/Marine amphibious terms, and illustrates relationships of Navy/Marine functional organizations.

SPECIFIC RATIONALE

Under the General Rationale it was determined that amphibious forces are compatible with the United States' low profile approach with foreign nations as portrayed by the Nixon Doctrine. In this section the more specific attributes of amphibious force applications will be examined and discussed.

Other than the actual strategic option of warfighting, the amphibious force strategic applications lie in the diverse modes of influence projection, deterrence, protection of US interests and assistance to allies.

In the area of influence projection, the amphibious force, through goodwill visits, is able to project friendship or show force at variable levels of visibility. This force by the very nature of its composition including the extensive medical facilities aboard the larger ships is particularly valuable in rendering humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The force as a whole and the LPH in particular with its large hospital facilities and helicopter medical evacuation teams has proven its worth two times within the past four years by assisting the people of the Philippines in recovering from typhoon disasters.

Another example was the dispatching of the Amphibious Assault Ship, USS Guam (LPH-9) as a single unit in response to requests for aid after the devastating earthquake in Peru during May 1970.

The Guam was responsible for 804 sorties, delivering relief supplies to more than 50 towns and villages, lifting more than 380,000 pounds of cargo, evacuating to her own

medical facilities 83 injured, returning 46 patients to hospitals ashore, and airlifting 1204 passengers.¹⁶

The presence of the amphibious force provides a certain degree of deterrence which varies with the visibility of the force and the international tensions which may exist at that time. By keeping the precise employment objectives unclear, the potential enemy may be discouraged from taking hostile actions toward allies. Psychologically, the potential enemy knows that the rapid response of the amphibious force is present and can be employed immediately upon its arrival in the objective area.

Certainly one of the greatest plus factors for the amphibious force is its ability to protect US property and to evacuate US nationals in destabilized situations. For any military power to effectively support foreign policy it must be credible. Friend and foe must believe in it. Recent examples of crises during which amphibious forces have demonstrated effective support for the varying demands in foreign policy include Lebanon in 1958, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Vietnam. Admiral Burke summed up the Lebanon amphibious operation thusly,

This task force was ready for any action, ready for the orderly landing that actually took place, ready for minor skirmishes or major battles. It was logistically prepared to stay, to fight, or to maintain order, which it did.¹⁷

Examples of amphibious support assistance to allies can be provided by the following means: Conducting combined training exercises, providing advisors, supporting psychological operations and the ability to operate from the sea without establishing high visibility and high cost commitments ashore.

When, or if it becomes necessary to actually commit US forces into combat in support of the best interest of the United States, the modern amphibious force lends itself particularly well to its ability to give partial assistance to allies without heavy commitment of major US ground forces. If this scenario is desired, the advantages of the amphibious force are as follows:

- (1) Operation from the sea without establishment of high visibility and high cost commitments ashore.
- (2) Selective levels of US support without unintentionally giving evidence of a US over-reaction that would tend to escalate the conflict.
- (3) Place onus of self-defense on allies through selected support and easily revoked commitment.
- (4) Keep the precise employment unclear to opponents.
- (5) Deploy and operate in areas where facilities are denied, lacking or hastily prepared.
- (6) Respond rapidly.
- (7) Project forces into a hostile environment.
- (8) Conduct counterinsurgency operations.¹⁸

SEABASING

The Nixon Doctrine relates to the reduction of US presence on foreign shores, while honoring commitments to allies and by retaining the capability to project US influence in support of our national interests.

Naval control of the seas is increasingly threatened by progressive extensions of national sovereignty over narrow passages and restricted waters. Naval control of the seas requires not only superiority over other naval forces, but also the capability to ensure freedom of passage through the straits and narrow seas which constrict strategic naval movement. Control of the seas thus necessarily implies a capability to seize control of critical points governing passage through these constricted waters, as well as a capability to seize and defend advanced naval bases.¹⁹

This quote comes from an unclassified joint letter issued by the Offices of Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters Marine Corps dealing with the subject of "New Amphibious Warfare Initiatives" dated 20 March 1972; however, it could have well been stated by Alfred Thayer Mahan one hundred years ago as it propounds one of his basic theses concerning sea power, i.e., control of critical straits.

The goal of seabasing is the ability to apply precisely metered power, tailored to specific requirements, without becoming inextricably embroiled in an escalating situation. With this in mind, a prediction of the mid-range (next ten years) amphibious force functional operations can be compared with the classical amphibious operations of the past thirty years. First, the number and types of the various amphibious ships to be employed in seabasing will be derived directly from the assets previously

discussed in The Make Up, i.e., about sixty-five 20 knot ships.

These ships can be augmented by special logistics ships when necessary. Logistics ships are in the present inventory of the Navy's service force.

The current doctrine for amphibious warfare addresses the classical concept of amphibious assault operations conducted by an Amphibious Task Force (ships) and Marine Amphibious Force (ATF/MAF) against a relatively sophisticated enemy, in what may well be assumed to be high-intensity warfare. Seabased amphibious operations are designed to be conducted by smaller forces such as the Amphibious Task Group (ships) with the Marine Amphibious Brigade embarked, or the smaller Amphibious Task Unit (ships) with the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked in the ships. These smaller seabased forces are limited by their very size to the lower-intensity warfare and crisis control situations.

In the classical amphibious operation, the Landing Force Commander (CLF), along with his command, control, communication and support elements are established ashore as soon as practical. Under the Seabased Concept, the CLF will normally retain his headquarters in the seabase with Amphibious Task Force Commander (ATF), who remains in overall command. The joint headquarters normally would be aboard a specially configured command ship (LCC) which is magnificently suited to handle a wide spectrum of command and control functions. If the LCC is not available, either the LPH or LPD command and control facilities are sufficient to handle the ATU/MAU size operation. Additionally, when conducting classical amphibious assault operations, logistic support and air support

facilities are moved ashore. Under seabased operations, these extensive facilities may be completely seabased, or at least reduced to a small shore established tactical support element. Seabasing thus reduces the conventional burden of establishing, maintaining, and defending logistic installations and major command and control facilities ashore. This allows for relative ease of extraction of the force and provides an increase in tactical mobility, since only the units required for the mission accomplishment are put ashore.

Not only does seabasing provide for both strategic and tactical flexibility, but it can provide for diplomatic flexibility by the metered application of power ashore. With this concept, national command authorities are no longer faced with go/no-go decisions for an all out assault or no assault at all. The landing force may be held afloat for extended periods of time and by varying the degree of visibility can possibly serve the diplomatic interests of the US without ever committing any force ashore.

Seabasing cannot be considered to be a complete substitute for conventional amphibious operations, but it has applications which can be useful within the spectrum of the smaller low-key involvements and is compatible with military budget constraints. The primary variance between the classic amphibious operation and the seabasing concept is in the use of the Navy's ships. During the classic amphibious operation, the ships are not locked into the support of forces ashore; therefore, these ships can support other missions once control is passed to the Landing Force Commander (CLF) ashore or they may pick up multiple loads of troops and equipment

to support the original landing. As discussed previously, it is now reemphasized that the ships are an integral part of the seabasing concept. They must remain in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) until the entire operation is complete and all forces are back aboard the ships. In either the classic or seabased evolutions, the amphibious force is subject to several forms of enemy attack in the AOA but seabasing has a higher risk factor as the ships remain in the AOA longer. This infers that the national command decisionmakers have a complete understanding of the risk element involving major world powers before embarking on the plan to employ the projection of force ashore especially in the case of seabasing.

Because of its size, seabasing infers a Commando posture to the Marine Corps and as such it represents only one portion of the Marine Corps mission. The need for the complete amphibious capability is well known to both the Army and the Marines and the seabasing concept does not replace this requirement.

Appendix II is provided in order to illustrate an oversimplified example of the seabasing concept. It is stressed that the key to the success of such an operation is the lack of opposition to the forces afloat (ships in the AOA) and the fact that the operation is small and does not present a significant threat to other major powers. The scale of involvement will determine whether or not seabasing is a/the feasible plan of action to be employed to fulfill commitments commensurate with the Nixon Doctrine.

SUMMARY

Amphibious warfare as it has been developed in this chapter is but one element of sea power, naval warfare, sea control or whatever nomenclature is used to signify that our country will be able to use all of the oceans of the world as necessary to exercise the national strategy in the best interests of the United States.

The types of wars now possible are strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, theater conventional, and sub-theater conventional. Of the four categories, the ones that are most likely are the theater conventional and the sub-theater conventional. Of these two, the sub-theater conventional is the most probable.²⁰ Amphibious operations when used as instruments of national war strategy are highly compatible with the conventional categories of warfare and especially in dealing with sub-theater and lesser conflicts. Operations demanding expanded amphibious warfare capabilities will require the use of classical amphibious warfare procedures, whereas seabasing should solve the requirements of a lesser scope.

When dealing with the spectrum of non-nuclear deterrence, the amphibious forces assume their greatest value to the US national strategy. For deterrence to be realistic, the forces and their application or non-application to the specific situation must be credible. In order for these forces to be credible they must be relevant. The relevance of the amphibious force is forecast to be its most significant contribution to the US national strategy of the

1970's. The mobility and flexibility of this force allows it to be quickly and cheaply positioned as national strategy dictates, thus it becomes relevant to the situation. Relevant forces are those forces in the correct geographical position to exercise their credibility. The first level or degree of credibility is achieved when the potential enemy is sufficiently concerned as to the probable projection of the force that he alters his own strategic plans. If it becomes necessary to project force ashore and the amphibious force quickly attains the desired results, credibility becomes a proven fact.

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APPENDIX I

MISCELLANEOUS TABLE OF NAVY/MARINE AMPHIBIOUS TERMINOLOGY

<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>
NAVY AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON	MARINE
1 Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH)	Naval Amphibious Squadron(s)
2 Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD)	provide lift capabilities for
2 Dock Landing Ships (LSD)	Marine Forces:
2 to 4 Tank Landing Ships (LST)	MAF(s) Each consists of:
1 Amphibious Cargo Ship (LKA)	(1) Headquarters Element
	MAB(s) (2) Ground Combat Element
	(3) Aviation Element
	MAU(s) (4) Logistics Support
	Element
ATF/MAF	
ATF--Amphibious Task Force: Ships	MAF--Marine Amphibious Force: (a)
(Amphibious Squadrons), Naval	Ground combat element of a MAF is
personnel and organization as necessary	usually a Marine division. Consists
to support a MAF	of Assault Echelon (AE), reinforced
	with appropriate support units,
	Assault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE).
	(b) MAW--Marine Air Wing--supports
	all types of tactical air operations
	for MAF, both fixed and rotary wing.

NAVF

ATG/MAB

ATG—Amphibious Task Group: Ships, at least one amphibious squadron with naval personnel and organization which is required to support a MAB.

ATU/MAU

ATU—Amphibious Task Unit: Ships - No more than one Amphibious Squadron (usually part of a Squadron) Naval personnel/organization necessary to support a MAU.

MARINE

MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade: (a)

The MAB is a task organization that may be formed from 2/9 to 5/9 of the division/wing (MAF) team.

(b) BLT—Regimental Landing Team - ground combat element of the MAB

(c) Provisional MAC—Marine Air Group—Air Support for MAB, varied capabilities but always vertical envelopment.

MAU—Marine Amphibious Unit: (a)

Task organization is normally formed from 1/9 of the division/wing (MAF) team, relatively limited in scope, normally supported by seabase type of concept.

(b) BLT—Battalion Landing Team - ground combat element of a MAU.

(c) Composite Helicopter Squadron—aviation combat element of a MAU - provides vertical envelopment and support as necessary—fixed wing support normally provided from another source,

NAVY

MARINE

ARG

Amphibious Ready Group: The combination of ATU/MAU is normally referred to as an ARG-- The Navy/Marine team used to fulfill routine forward deployment requirements.

CATF--Commander Amphibious Task Force:

Retains overall control of ATF/MAF, ATG/MAB, ATU/MAU until control is passed ashore.

CLF--Commander Landing Force:

Commands the Marine forces MAF, MAB or MAU.

APPENDIX II

ILLUSTRATION OF A SEABASED AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

Orlandia, a nation which controls the Straits of Narrow connecting a large body of water and an ocean, has remained aloof from any firm assistance or commitments with other nations. Its interior borders are extremely rugged and the terrain is virtually impassable for military ground traffic. The United States considers it essential for sea control that Orlandia not become aligned with nations which may not look kindly toward the best interests of the United States.

A major earthquake on 12 June caused severe damage to the capital city of Lanai, located five miles inland, and to several smaller towns. Lines of communication were disrupted and serious food shortages resulted in many urban areas. Orlandian medical facilities were unable to cope with all of the casualties or to prevent any epidemic which may have resulted from the earthquake.

An Amphibious Task Unit/Marine Amphibious Unit (ATU/MAU), officially designated as ARG Tango, was directed to assist by providing medical assistance, engineering assistance, and transportation to support government relief efforts. The Seabased Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) arrived in the Straits of Narrow at 0600 on 14 June after having embarked a special medical team by helicopter in the LPH Pago Pago. The necessary liaison with the US Ambassador and the local government was completed during the early morning hours of the 14th. Part of the medical team was helicoptered ashore while several doctors including the chief surgeon remained in the LPH operating rooms in order to treat some of the more seriously injured who could not be accommodated

ashore as all major local hospitals were previously inundated with patients. Engineering personnel and heavy equipment were landed from LSTs on the sandy beaches at 1330 on the same day and began assistance in the rebuilding of bridges and in the restoration of normal lines of communication. Food supplies were quickly flown to distribution points ashore. Thirty-four patients were medevaced to the Pago Pago by 1500, and by 1300 seven major operations had been completed. All patients were treated and remained overnight in the ship's medical facility.

Insurgent forces had been active in Orlandia for months but had not previously been a serious threat to the government. The stronghold for this small band of renegades was in the rugged Ajax Mountains about 25 miles north of the capital city of Lanai. The insurgent forces had been supplied on a piecemeal basis by several nations which were not completely friendly with the US and the opportunity to capitalize on the national disaster was considered too ripe to be ignored. The rebel forces overran and occupied the hamlet of Torrent at the base of the mountains and continued their drive toward the village of Roma just 12 miles north of the capital. A prime objective in the rebel drive was to discredit the US disaster relief operations throughout the entire country.


One company of US Marines was landed by helicopter just north of Lanai and assigned the mission of protecting US personnel in the capital city. One company of Orlandian infantry engaged the rebels on the outskirts of Roma temporarily halting the insurgent drive.

The government of Orlandia requested US helicopter lift support for four infantry companies behind the lines of the insurgent forces.

Intelligence estimates placed the advancing rebel strength at about a two company size. US higher authority in Washington directed the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) to provide necessary support, stopping short of actually engaging the rebels in offensive combat. Authorization for the combatant use of the Marines was limited to the protection of US citizens and self-defense.

At 0600 on 15 June four companies of well equipped Orlandian infantry were landed by US Marine helicopters as previously requested. The rebel forces were crushed by 1100 that day and by evening regular troops of the Orlandian Army reoccupied the hamlet of Torrent. Many rebels surrendered; the surviving rebels quickly retreated into the Ajax Mountains and the incident was considered closed by the government of Orlandia.

The earthquake assistance by the Amphibious Ready Group continued for another ten days and the force departed the Straits of Narrow on 26 June for a well deserved rest and recreation period at the advanced US Naval Base Pogliapo. This seabased operation provided humanitarian assistance, reduced a threat to a vital strategic sea lane and increased the bond of friendship between the country of Orlandia and the United States.²¹


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